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Incidences of Speculative Attacks on Rupiah 





The objective of this study is to identify and date the episodes of high speculative attack 
periods against the Indonesian rupiah over the last fifteen years (i.e. from 1985 to 2003). 
From the findings, we hope to address the following set of questions. Had rupiah indeed 
been stable prior to its meltdown in the third quarter 1997? Arguably a more relevant 
question to be addressed at this point is whether the rupiah has stabilized, as measured 
by a relatively moderate EMP index, since its worst fall in late 1997? This study also 
hopes to introduce a simple measurement index to detect the presence of market 
pressures in the foreign exchange market, and to illustrate a reliable methodology to 
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1. Introduction 
 
Concerted speculative attacks on the regional currencies have long been 
underlined as one of the key features of the past incidences of financial and currency 
crises in various corners of the world during the past three decades, including that of the 
1997-financial crises in East Asia. Going back to the three generations of currency crises 
models, one can find different insights to the contributing factors of the currency crises of 
1970s, 1980s, early 1990s and the East Asian currencies in late 1990s, such as 
deterioration of economic fundamentals, inconsistency of government policy and self-
fulfilling market expectations.
1 However, despite their fundamental differences, each of 
these models consistently highlight the important role of speculative attacks in carrying 
out the final blows to the currencies of the crisis-effected economies.   
The objective of this study is to identify and date the episodes of high speculative 
attack periods against the Indonesian rupiah over the last fifteen years (i.e. from 1985 to 
2003). From the findings, we hope to address the following set of questions that have a 
number of pertinent policy implications. The most basic one is on the stability of rupiah 
during the pre-1997 financial crisis period. Had rupiah indeed been stable prior to its 
meltdown in the third quarter 1997? If it is found that the rupiah-US dollar rate were 
under frequent and severe speculative attacks in late 1980s and early to mid-1990s, one 
can therefore argue that there had been early warnings highlighting the fragility of the 
currency, and hence the meltdown of rupiah in 1997 should have been more promptly 
anticipated.  
Arguably a more relevant question to be addressed at this point is whether the 
rupiah has stabilized since its worst fall in late 1997? Based on understanding of the 
severity and the frequency of the market pressures/speculative attacks against the 
                                                 
1  Refer to Krugman (1979), Obstfeld (1996), Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996), and Williamson 
(2004) for further elaborations on the three generations of the currency crisis models.   4
rupiah during the post-1997, we should be able to conclude whether rupiah has indeed 
stabilized and to date the beginning period of the stability of rupiah.  Moreover, we may 
find that the market pressures against rupiah during the last two years of our observation 
period (2002 and 2003) for instance to be less than the average rate at the peak of the 
1997 crisis (i.e. 1998-1999). Yet, the average market pressures during the post-1997 
crisis period were in average still higher than the rate of the pre-1997 period. Thus 
despite the evidences of the returns of a more stable rupiah, one needs to add a caveat 
here that the local currency remained more fragile in the recent years than during the 
pre-1997 period.   
It is also important to note here that the relevance of the empirical works 
conducted in this study is not only limited to understand the ex-post fluctuations of the 
rupiah. But it also hopes to illustrate a relatively simple approach to generate a reliable 
measurement index to detect the presence of market pressures in the foreign exchange 
market. This index is inarguably useful, especially for the decision making process and 
the operation of monetary policy in the future. In 1999, a new central bank law was 
enacted. Although the law does not explicitly call for the use of inflation targeting as the 
key objective of the monetary policy in Indonesia, Alamsyah, et.al (2001) list several 
stylised facts that lead them to justify the adoption of explicit inflation targeting by the 
central bank. To achieve the targeted low inflation rate, a stable local currency has 
arguably been pushed forward as one of the important pre-requisites (Calvo and 
Reinhart (2004)). Naturally, the ability of the monetary authority to gauge the ups and 
downs of the market pressures / speculative attacks against the rupiah is therefore very 
critical for the overall success of its operations.   
To address the previously listed key policy questions, we need, first and 
foremost, to construct a proper and reliable measurement for examining the stability of 
the rupiah. This paper hopes to highlight a number of recent developments on both   5
economic theory and methodology to construct the necessary measurement or indicator 
for identifying the presence of high market pressures or speculative attacks against a 
currency.  
A large number of studies have emerged starting mid-1990s attempting to 
construct a single market index that would signal the presence of the market pressures 
on the exchange rate (EMP) of a currency on a timely manner. Some of these notable 
studies include the works of Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995, 1996) on the ERM 
currency crises of 1992-1993; Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) on the Mexican or 
Tequila crisis of 1994-1995; and Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) on the 1997 
East Asian currency crisis. Despite few but relatively minor differences on the 
constructions of the EMP index, all of these studies agree that the volatility of the local 
currency does not adequately signal the presence of high market pressures in the 
economy. Government policies manifested through monetary policy actions and 
intervention in the foreign exchange market, moderate supposed large movements in 
exchange rates. In the same manner, considering in isolation, movements in reserves 
and interest rate aside from exchange rates also offer only a partial view of the severity 
of shocks in the economy. Therefore, combining them should convey a more informative 
and reasonable measure of the extent of currency crises, and referred to as the index of 
exchange market pressure (henceforth known as EMP index).           
Having constructed the “signalling index”, the next natural step is to address the 
issue of “crisis threshold”. It is widely known that the foreign exchange market is 
generally characterized by its frequent turbulences or volatilities. It is however arguably 
inappropriate to suggest that the market watchers and the policy makers should treat 
any daily volatilities or market pressures as signals for the presence of concerted efforts 
to speculate against the local currency. The question is at what stage the EMP should   6
be considered very high and thus signals the presence of strong speculative attacks 
against the local currency.     
For most of early studies (and some recent works), the convenient construction 
of thresholds, often involving arbitrary multiples of the standard deviation of the EMPs to 
be above its mean, has become the usual fashion of choice.
2 Our paper will show that a 
careful examination of the basic statistical distribution of the measures of exchange 
market pressure will reveal that the conventional method of defining currency crisis is 
statistically flawed or inaccurate in capturing the ‘true’ dispersion of any given exchange 
market pressure series.  The conventional method of employing the mean and the 
standard deviations is found to underestimate the frequency of the speculative attacks. 
Most importantly, we will also show that due to the non-normality of the statistical 
distribution of the EMP indices in general, we have to simply avoid relying on any 
parametric assumptions in identifying the threshold. Accordingly, our study will apply the 
Extreme Value Theory (EVT). To avoid the potential problem with the small sample 
when calculating the tail parameter of the Hill estimate (1975), we will adopt the tail 
index estimator proposed by Huisman, Koedijk, Kool, and Palm (2001) ---henceforth 
HKKP---, which is unbiased in small sample. 
Next section of the paper will briefly review the trends and stylised facts on the 
local currency of Indonesia. Section three will then introduce the basic construction of 
the  Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (KLR) exchange market pressure index. In this 
section also, the concepts of EVT and the HKKP test will be introduced. The analyses of 
the test results will be presented in section four. A brief concluding section will then end 
the paper.   
    
                                                 
2 Studies have usually adopted 1.5, 2, 2.5, or even more multiples of the standard deviation as 
their choices. See Frankel and Rose (1996).   7
2.  Trends and Stylised Facts on Rupiah 
2.1  Period of Stability: 1985-1996  
In November 1978, following a major devaluation of the rupiah from its seven-
year U.S. dollar peg of Rp415.00 to Rp625 per U.S. dollar, Bank Indonesia (henceforth 
BI), the central bank of Indonesia, formally shifted its exchange rate policy to a basket-
pegged using as its basket the currencies of the country’s major trading partners. 
Furthermore, with the drastic decline in the world crude oil prices and the rate of inflation 
averaging double-digit throughout the early 1980s, the Indonesian economy would 
endure two more major devaluation episodes in 1983 and in 1986.  
Exchange rate management policy in Indonesia would play a vital role in 
supporting an extensive liberalisation and reform packages undertaken by the local 
government that ranged from the deregulation of the financial sector, reductions in 
various import tariffs, provision of investment incentives, and in the promotion of the 
country’s non-oil export sector starting mid-1980s (Siregar, 1999). In order to ensure the 
competitiveness of the latter, BI considers the inflation differential between the domestic 
rate and the rates of its major trading partners as the main factor in the setting of the 
official nominal exchange rate. For instance, as is clearly evident from Figure 1, when 
one takes into account the ratio of the CPI in Indonesia to that of the CPI in the U.S., it is 
without a doubt that the domestic price level has continuously been rising faster than in 
the United States. Accordingly, as depicted in Figure 2, throughout the early and the 
mid-1990s, Bank Indonesia permitted a gradual or ‘crawling’ annual depreciation of the 
nominal rupiah rate against the U.S. dollar and its intervention bands. In doing so, the 
central bank managed to keep the real exchange rate of the rupiah fairly stable.             
More importantly, evidences captured in Figures 1 and 2 confirm widely held and 
credible documented claims that the rupiah was in a de-facto crawling-band throughout 
the 1990s until this was abolished at the height of the East Asian crisis in August 1997. It   8
is interesting to note as well that there were eight times in the 1990s prior to August 
1997 and six times altogether, within the period of January 1994 to September 1996 that 
BI cautiously exercised steps to widen this band (Williamson, 1998; Djiwandono, 2000) 
(see Table 1). 
 
2.2  Turbulent Period: 1997-2003 
  The severe speculative attack on the eve of August 1997, a month after Bank 
Indonesia had just widened the trading band from 8 to 12 percent, led to an involuntary 
abandonment of the pre-crisis exchange rate policy and with it the scrapping of the 
intervention bands and the forced adoption of a ‘crisis float’. As clearly shown in Figure 
2, the sharp spikes in both the nominal and real rate of the rupiah for the rest of 1997 
and throughout 1998 would clearly have detrimental effects on corporate balance sheets 
and the subsequent bankruptcies on a large-scale. From the rate of around 
1US$=Rp.2380 in January 1997, the rupiah depreciated to its lowest rate at around 
1US$=Rp15000 in June 1998. 
Though the rupiah had eventually recovered and appreciated to as high as 
1US$= Rp6700 in June 1999, the currency however remained very volatile during the 
post-1997. To estimate the volatility rates of rupiah, we employ different types of ARCH 
models. The GARCH specification that we consider takes the form: 
 
  t t t e NER a a NER + + = − 1 1 0 ln ln , where:  ) , 0 ( ~ t t h N e     (1) 
  t t t t u h e h + + + = − − 1
2
1 γ β α .                         (2) 
 
Where:  () t LnNER is the nominal exchange rate of rupiah against the US dollar in the 
log-form.    9
The conditional variance equation (Equation 2) described above is a function of 
three terms: (1) the mean α ; (2) news about volatility from the previous period, 
measured as the lag of the squared residual from the mean equation: 
2
1 − t e  (the 
ARCH term); and (3) the last periods forecast error variance,  1 − t h  (the GARCH term). 
The test is done on monthly rupiah rates from January 1987 to December 2003. The 
GARCH conditional variance will give us the estimate of the size of volatility of rupiah 
during the observation period. Different types of ARCH models such as ARCH, GARCH 
and EGARCH models were estimated on the data. However, only the GARCH(1,1) 
models are found to be superior in generating the volatility for the rupiah nominal 
exchange rates against the US dollar.
3  
Several interesting numbers are worth highlighting. At its peak, the average 
monthly volatility of the USD-Rp rate from January 1998 to July 1998 was more than 200 
times higher than the average from January 1997 to June 1997 (Figure 3). The 
GARCH(1,1) conditional variance also shows that the volatility rate declined substantially 
starting 1999. From January 2000 to December 2003, the average volatility rate was 
only (0.03) of the rate for the first six months of 1998, but the rate since January 2000 
was still about 60 times higher than the reported rate during the first six-months of 1997.  
    What is perhaps the most interesting aspect of the exchange rate policy in 
Indonesia after the crisis is to render an accurate description of its actual exchange rate 
policy.
4 According to its website, after the crisis, BI described its exchange rate policy as 
a free float exchange rate since August 1999.
5 Furthermore, the website also indicates 
                                                 
3 The GARCH(1,1) test results can be made available upon request to the author.  
4 This argument comes from a certain consensus among policymakers and academics alike that 
before the crisis, the crisis-hit East Asian countries including Indonesia declared official exchange 
rate regimes that were not in conformity with their actual exchange rate policy, i.e., the so-called 
discrepancy between de-jure and de-facto exchange rate regimes mentioned earlier in the 
discussion.     
5 www.bi.go.id.   10
that in order to maintain a stable exchange rate, the monetary authority performs 
sterilization (intervention) in foreign exchange market at a certain period of time, 
especially during an irregular fluctuation of the exchange rate. Under the IMF 
classification of exchange arrangement until end-of-March 2001, Indonesia is classified 
as an independent float. The IMF defines an independent float as an arrangement where 
“the exchange rate is market-determined, with any foreign exchange intervention aimed 
at moderating the rate of change and preventing undue fluctuations in the exchange 
rate, rather than establishing a level for it (various IMF Annual Reports). 
However, this statement alone makes it inconsistent with the standard textbook 
definition of a clean float. Though, since December 2001 to the present, the BI had 
changed from an independent float to a managed float based on the IMF’s official 
classification, distinguishing between a managed float and an independent float is not 
that entirely clear.
6 
  According to estimates conducted by Pontines and Siregar (2005) on 
probabilities of intervention by the BI from the period of 1985 to 2003, and substantiated 
by official publications released by the BI,
7 the central bank resorted to a prolonged 
defence of the rupiah since early 1999, which moderated somewhat for most of 2000, 
which again resumed in 2001. Beginning in 2002 until the end of 2003, BI had allowed 
some greater flexibility to the rupiah. In view of these results, and insofar as the 
distinction between a managed float and an independent (free) float is concern, it seems 
that, on average, Indonesian post-crisis exchange rate policy resembles more like of a 
managed float rather than a free-float.  
 
                                                 
6 The IMF defines a managed float as “the authorities influence exchange rate arrangements 
through interventions to counter the long-term trend of the exchange rate, without specifying a 
predetermined path, or without having a specific exchange rate target.  
7  On this  refer to Chapter 3 of the 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 Annual Reports of the Bank of 
Indonesia.   11
3.  Exchange Market Pressure Index and Crisis Threshold 
As briefly discussed, the exchange rate is said to be under “stress” or “under 
speculative attack”, if there is a significant increase in the market pressure on the 
exchange rate of the currency. The speculative attacks are not only defined as capturing 
instances of successful ones, i.e., when a depreciation of the currency occurs, but as 
well as instances of unsuccessful attacks (pressure rebuffed by loss in reserves and/or 
rise in interest rates) (Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart, 1998; Goldstein, Kaminsky, and 
Reinhart, 2000). The seminal idea is from the early work of Girton-Roper (1977) that any 
excess demand for foreign exchange can be fulfilled through non-mutually exclusive 
conduits. If the speculative attack (currency pressure) is successful, there is a sharp 
depreciation of the domestic currency. However, at other times, the attack or the high 
market pressure on the exchange rate can be repelled or warded off through raising 
interest rates and/or running down on the foreign exchange reserves.  
An exchange market pressure (EMP) index can be constructed as a weighted 
average of the changes in exchange rate, in foreign exchange reserves, and in interest 
rates. The question is how to weigh the three components of the index of speculative 
pressure.
8 Next, we will briefly review one of the recent works on EMP indices that will 
then be adopted for our empirical analysis.  
 
3.1  Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart Exchange Market Pressure Index 
The original construction of the exchange market pressure (EMP) of Kaminsky, 
Lizondo, and Reinhart (KLR) (1998) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) did mention the 
need to consider the role of interest rate, but due to various constraints, mostly with the 
                                                 
8   An unweighted index is simpler to construct, but the major drawback is that an unweighted 
index will be driven or dominated by the most volatile variable, and usually it is the movements in 
reserves (especially at the presence of extreme/high market pressures to sell the local currency) .   12
interest rate data, they decided not to include the interest rate component.
 9 In the case 
of Indonesia, the role of interest rate as a monetary policy instrument to stabilize the 
local currency, especially during the peak of the crisis in 1998, was highly visible. Given 
this stylised fact of the economy, we modified the standard KLR-EMP index to include 
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where:  t i EMPI ,  is again the exchange rate market pressure index for country i in period 
t;  t i e ,  the units of country i’s currency per U.S. dollars in period t;  t i r ,  gross foreign 
reserves of country i in period t;  t i i ,  the nominal interest rate for country i in period t;  e σ  
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deviation of the change in the nominal interest rate,  . ,t i i ∆  
From equation (3), one can observe the different weights given to these three 
key components of exchange market pressures. In particular, the weights for the interest 
rate and reserve fluctuations depend on the relative size of their standard deviations ( i σ  
and  r σ , respectively) against that of the exchange rate ( e σ ).  The EMP index increases 
with a depreciation of the domestic currency, a loss of international reserve and a rise in 
the domestic interest rate. A rise in index reflects stronger selling pressure on the 
domestic currency. 
                                                 
9  Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) argue that they did not include the interest rate component in 
their application because of the lack of complete interest rate data for the countries that they 
studied (pg.498).   13
3.2  Extreme Value Theory 
  Once we calculate the EMP indices, the next step is to determine the threshold 
for separating the episodes of crises from the full observation samples. As briefly 
discussed, we apply the tail index estimator proposed by Huisman, Koedijk, Kool, and 
Palm (2001) ---henceforth HKKP---, which is unbiased in small sample cases. The HKKP 
methodology starts with the commonly used Hill (1975) estimator where we assume that 
there is a sample of n positive independent observations drawn from some unknown 
fat-tailed distribution. Let the parameter γ  be the tail-index of the distribution, and  ) (i x  
be the ith-order statistic such that  ) ( ) 1 ( i x i x ≤ −  for  . ,......, 2 n i =  Suppose that we opt to 
include  k  observations from the right tail in our estimate. Hill (1975) proposed the 
following estimator for γ : 
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where:  k  is the pre-specified number of tail observations. Naturally, the choice of k  is 
crucial to obtain an unbiased estimate of the tail-index. 
  HKKP (2001) shows that for a general class of distribution functions the 
asymptotic expected value of the conventional hill estimator to be biased and increasing 
monotonically with k . Similarly, the asymptotic variance of the Hill estimator to be 









 Generally, this problem will only be resolved when the sample size 
goes to infinity for given k . 
  For our small sample observations, HKKP (2001) introduces an estimator that 
overcomes the problem of the need to select a “single” optimal k  in small sample   14
observations. HKKP (2001) proposes that for values of k  smaller than some threshold 
value κ , the bias of the conventional Hill estimate of γ  increases almost linearly in k  
and can be approximated by: 
 
) ( ) ( 1 0 k k k ε β β γ + + = ,   κ ,...., 2 , 1 = k     (5) 
where  ) (k ε is a disturbance term.  HKKP (2001) also shows that the modified Hill 








. Accordingly, for our 
empirics, we propose to compute  ) (k γ  for a range value of k  from 1 to κ  (roughly 









  To estimate Equation (5), HKKP(2001) adopt the Weighed Least Square (WLS), 
instead of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), to deal with the potential 
heteroscedasticity in the error term  )) ( ( k ε of Equation (5). The weight has 
( ) k ,...... 2 , 1  as diagonal elements and zeros elsewhere. The estimate of γ from the 
WLS regression is an approximately unbiased estimate of the tail-index.  
 
4. Result  and  Analyses 
4.1 Data 
  All data in monthly frequencies were drawn from the IMF International Financial 
Statistics database covering the period from 1985 to 2003. The exchange rate is 
expressed in Indonesian rupiah per U.S. dollar. To capture the periods of relatively 
higher inflationary pressures, a measure of the real exchange rate is adopted in the 
calculation of the EMP index. The real exchange rate is calculated by multiplying the 
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where: P is the consumer price index of Indonesia, and 
USA P  is the U.S. consumer 
price index. An increase in RERt (real exchange rate) or NERt (nominal exchange rate) 
implies an appreciation of the U.S. dollar against the Indonesian rupiah. 
The remaining data requirements in the construction of the exchange market 
pressure indices are as follows.  A measure of the interest rate differential is defined as 
the difference between the domestic interest rate and the U.S. federal fund rate, with the 
overnight money market rates used as the measure of domestic interest rate. Line 11 of 
the IMF-IFS database (foreign assets of the monetary authorities) was used as the 
measure of foreign exchange reserves.       
 
4.2  The shortcoming of the Conventional methodology. 
  A number of interesting analyses can be generated out of the empirical exercises 
presented in section three. To start with, Figure 4 clearly shows the period of high 
market pressure against the rupiah during the last 15 years. Since we are interested only 
on the high positive value of EMP (Equation 3), the extreme values are found to be 
around the period of the 1997 financial crisis. The relatively more moderate ones are 
also reported in late 1986. With the exception of these two periods of high EMP index in 
the past two decades, it is arguably difficult, based on looking at Figure 4, to make any 
conclusive analysis for the rest of observation periods. What level of threshold should be 
imposed? How do you derive the threshold?  
One simple way is to adopt the conventional method, whereby one may fix one 
or more standard deviations above the mean of the series as a threshold. Obviously the 
problem here is how many standard deviations should one apply for the threshold?   16
Applying two standard deviations will give us a different set of high EMP episodes than 
when three standard deviations are applied. As reported in Table 2, the application of 
the conventional method on the EMP of the Indonesian rupiah gives us the highest 
number of episodes of speculative attacks only when we adopt 1.5 standard deviations 
above the mean.
10 Thus, the outcome of the conventional process of selecting the 
threshold is arguably not a robust one. 
The primary shortcoming of the conventional method lies with its basic 
assumption that the series is normally distributed. However, as reported in Table 3, the 
null hypothesis of a normally distributed EMP index is rejected based on the Jarque-
Bera statistics. A similar conclusion can also be derived based on Figure 5, where the 
histogram of the rupiah EMP series overlaid by its corresponding normal probability 
density functions. It is obvious that the EMP index departs significantly from the normal 
distribution mass of observations in the tails and the observed regularity of a great 
number of peak observations at the centre of the distribution. 
 As discussed, by adopting the HKKP-Extreme Value Theory, we do not have to 
arbitrarily select the threshold level and rely on the assumption that the series must be 
normally distributed. Based on the true distribution of the EMP series observed during 
the period of 1985-2003, the HKKP testing provides us with a number of “extreme-
values of the computed EMPs”. Before we conduct the actual HKKP-EVT test, the unit-
root property of the EMP series must first be tested. The series is found to be stationary 
(Table 4). To ensure the unbiasedness of the weighted least square (WLS) test result, 
the Ljung-Box autocorrelation test is also conducted. Table 5 indicates that the null-
hypothesis of no autocorrelation can be rejected.  
                                                 
10  We tested also for one, two and three standard deviations. The results are not posted in the 
paper, but they can be made available upon a request to the authors.   17
As discussed, the Hill estimator requires that the EMP series are rank-ordered 
from lowest to highest denoted as (xi), and uses maximum likelihood estimation of the 
tail index (γ ) –shown in Equation 5. Although asymptotically unbiased, the Hill estimator 
is biased in relatively small samples. In accordance with the suggestion of HKPP (2001), 
to deal with the estimation of the tail with a small sample size, we use equation (5) in 
estimating a weighted least squares (WLS) regression, after computing the γ (k) for a 
range of values of k.
11 Consequently, the essence is to identify the right-tail outliers or 
‘extreme value’ observations since the right-tail distribution of any EMP index ordered 
distribution will automatically determine the number and incidence of currency pressure 
episodes that the rupiah experienced during the observed period. Accordingly, as 
suggested by Diebold, Schuermann, and Stroughair (DSS) (2000) and employed by 
Pozo and Dorantes (2003), the recursive residuals were derived from the weighted least 
squares regression to diagnose structural change which will guide us in the selection of 
the optimal k.  
Figure 6 depicts the recursive residuals from our computed EMP index. The 
recursive residuals are plotted against the band-with of plus and minus two standard 
errors. When we consider the empirical distribution of the ordered EMP index, the 
apparent break around the right-hand side of the recursive residual plots appropriately 
correspond to the optimal choice of k, or equivalently, the number of ‘extreme’ or right-
tail observations have now been identified.  
Table 6 reports 26 numbers  ) (k of high EMPs, which translates into 16 or 13 
periods of high market pressures or speculative attacks against the rupiah, depending 
on the number of exclusion period (three or six months). Given the fact that high 
speculative attacks could last for months, a standard process is to impose the exclusion 
                                                 
11 The WLS results are not reported here, but they can be made available upon request.     18
window to avoid double counting the number of attacks. So a three-month window for 
instance implies that three consecutive months of high EMP index will be counted as 
one episode of crisis or extreme market pressure period. Comparing the number of 
speculative attacks on the foreign exchange market reported in Tables 2 and 6, we can 
clearly conclude that the conventional method of applying the mean and standard 
deviation has underestimated the frequencies of attacks on the rupiah during the past 15 
years. 
 
4.3  The Dates and the Events 
  Once we identify the incidences of high speculative attacks/currency crises, it is 
relatively straightforward to date the starting period of each of those events. To provide 
more conclusive analyses, we try to associate the dates with economic and political 
events, local or international, that may contribute to the rise in the EMP levels. As also 
indicated by Pozo and Dorantes (2003), the listing of political and economic events here 
is only suggestive of events that may have initiated the financial distress on the rupiah. 
But we have not attempted any causation test in any formal way.  
  The dates and the events from the Extreme Value Test are posted in Table 7. 
From the results, it is apparent that about 10 years before the outbreak of the 1997 
financial crisis in East Asia, the rupiah has indeed been under attacks/selling pressures 
at least around eight times. The last significant attack occurred in late 1995. In general, 
these attacks were not successful in causing major depreciations of the rupiah or 
triggering massive financial crises, as in 1997. However, despite its stable nominal rate, 
shown in Figure 2, during the period of 1986-1996, the Indonesian rupiah was frequently 
exposed to speculative pressures in the foreign exchange market. Only through the 
active interventions of the monetary authority that any of those pre-1997 attacks did not 
cause any further severe and adverse impacts on the local economy.   19
  Another interesting point to highlight from Table 7 is on the natures of the events. 
Under the strong rules of President Suharto, political uncertainties arguably did not 
contribute significantly to the attacks against the rupiah during the pre-1997 period. Most 
of the events in 1980s and early to mid-1990s were associated with local and 
international economic events. The rapid reforms of the financial sector during the late 
1980s in particular, with the opening of the banking sector and the capital market, have 
brought about a significant increase in investment in the local economy, especially 
portfolio investments. Coupled with the lack of transparency and genuine structural 
reforms, the rapid opening of the capital account led to a number of banking 
failures/scandals in 1990 and 1994, and triggered selling pressures on the rupiah.  
  In addition to local events, the turbulences on the international foreign exchange 
market have also been responsible to speculative pressures against the rupiah. The 
drastic drop in oil prices in 1985 and 1986, and the Mexican peso crisis of 1995 have 
shown that the Indonesian rupiah was exposed to the uncertainties in the global market.  
This confirms the high degree of integration of the Indonesian market with global 
markets, and the increasing susceptibility of the Indonesian rupiah to adverse 
developments in international markets. 
  In contrast, post-1997 events were largely driven by political uncertainties in the 
country. The dismissal of President Suharto in early 1998 and President Abdurrahman 
Wahid in 2001 worsened an already politically tense situation in the country. One can 
argue that the struggle for political stability has contributed significantly to weak market 
confidences on the local currency during the post 1997 period.   
 
4.4  The severity of the attacks and the return of a stable rupiah. 
  From table 7, our empirics found no evidences of high market pressures against 
the rupiah from January 2002 to the end of our observation period of December 2003.   20
Thus, this enables us to conclude that the period of a relatively stable local currency in 
Indonesia is only reported almost five years after the initial outbreak of the 1997 financial 
crisis. 
  There is one more interesting observation that can be reported from our empirical 
results. Table 8 ranks the dates of speculative attacks based on its severity, reflected by 
the size of the EMP index. It is shown that the period of post-1990 has seen in general 
more severe attacks or higher market pressures against the rupiah than during the 
period before that. With the exception of the EMP size for November 1986 crisis 
episode, the top five most severe crisis episodes in general occurred during the post-
1990.  As should also be re-emphasized here, with a more globally integrated domestic 
market, the local currency has increasingly been exposed to the high volatility in 
international currency markets, and therefore will likely be subjected to more frequent 
and severe speculative attacks.      
         
5. Conclusion 
  Our study examines the incidences of high market pressures, reflecting the 
presence of speculative attacks, against the rupiah from 1985 to 2003. Instead of 
narrowly relying on the fluctuations of the nominal exchange rate, we adopt the 
commonly used concept of exchange market pressure (EMP) index. The application of 
the HKKP Extreme Value Theory methodology is also employed to generate a more 
appropriate and consistent threshold to separate the high market pressure periods from 
the low ones. From the empirical testing, several key findings have been underlined and 
analysed in the previous section.      
  More should be done in future research works to understand the speculative 
attacks on the local currency. One extension is to consider real exchange rates of the 
Indonesian rupiah against other major world currencies, such as the yen and the euro, in   21
the construction of the EMP index. With the role of the US dollar had been found to be 
very significant in influencing the movements of rupiah, especially during the period of 
1986-1996 as shown in Figures 1-2, the rate of the rupiah against the yen has in 
average been found to be significantly more volatile that the rupiah against the US dollar 
rate (Siregar and Rajan (2004)). Given the high interdependence of the Indonesian 
economy with the Japanese market and the greater volatility in the rupiah-yen rate, one 
should expect to find more incidences of speculative attacks against the rupiah.    
Extending on our analyses in the previous section, further researches should 
also evaluate the rise and fall in the EMP index. The focus should, in particular, be to 
examine the driving factors behind the incidence of market attacks against the rupiah. 
What can explain the absence of high market pressures during the period of 2002 and 
2003? Was it largely due to “sounder domestic economic fundamentals” as a result of a 
number of both economic and political reforms initiated during the post-1997 crisis 
period? Or has it also been partly due to the fact that the country experienced 
substantially more moderate flows of portfolio capital in the last few years as foreign 
investments in the economy in particular remained very weak, especially when 
compared to the period of mid-1990s?  
The annual average rates of approved foreign and domestic investment during 
the peak of the financial crisis (1998-1999) were less than 40 percent and 60 percent of 
the average rates between 1995-1997, respectively. The sharp fall in the approved 
amount of direct investment has also been further worsened by the low realization rate 
of the investment. Official reports indicate that only less than 50 percent of the approved 
domestic and foreign investments were eventually realized between 2000-2004.
12  If the 
weak investment is found to be the main contributing factor, then the stable rupiah will 
likely to be a very temporary phenomenon, and that the currency will continue to be 
                                                 
12  These investment numbers were sourced from the Board of Investment Database.   22
fragile and likely to experience more rounds of attacks together with the returns of more 
substantial investment commitments in the future.  
It is important to stress out again the adverse implication of political uncertainties 
on the volatility of the local currency. The rise in market pressures against the rupiah 
during the past few years have arguably been associated with the instability in the 
leadership of the Indonesian government. It remains to be seen whether the political 
climate will significantly improve in the near future under the leadership of Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono, the first directly elected President of the country. 
In short, having more conclusive understandings on the natures of the attacks 
should help the government of Indonesia at the very least in selecting more effective 
policy responses to deal with the high market pressures. For the monetary authority in 
particular, the inability to detect the presence of high market pressures against the 
rupiah and to understand the root-causes of the attacks will unquestionably undermine 
the capacity to pursue its key policy objective of managing price stability and thus to 
achieve the targeted inflation rate.       
 
    23
Reference: 
Alamsyah, H., Joseph, C., Agung, J., and Zulvredy, D. (2001), “Framework for  
Implementing Inflation Trageting in Indonesia”, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 
Vol. 37, No. 3, (December), pp. 309-324.   
 
  Bank of Indonesia. 2000-2003, Annual Reports. 
 
  Calvo, G.A., and Reinhart, C.M. (2002), “Fear of Floating”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 117 (2), pp. 379-408. 
 
de Vries, C. G. (1994), “Stylized Facts of Nominal Exchange Rate Returns”, The  
Handbook of International Macroeconomics, (ed) F. Van der Ploeg, Blackwell 
Publishers. 
 
Djiwandono, S. (2000), “Policy Responses Facing Financial Crisis”, mimeo.  
 
Diebold, F., Schuermann, T., and Stroughair, J., 2000, Pitfalls and Opportunities  
in the Use of Extreme Value Theory in Risk Management, in: P. Embrechts (ed.), 
Extremes and Integrated Risk Management, Risk Books, U.K. 
 
Eichengreen, B., Rose, A., and Wyplosz, C., 1995, Exchange Market Mayhem: 
The Antecedents and Aftermaths of Speculative Attacks, Economic Policy, 21 (October), 
249-312.   
 
Eichengreen, B., Rose, A., and Wyplosz, C., 1996, Contagious Currency Crises: 
First Tests, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 98(4), 463-484. 
 
Frankel, J., and Rose, A.., 1996, Currency Crashes in Emerging Markets: An  
Empirical Treatment, Journal of International Economics,  41,  351-366. 
 
Girton, L. and D. Roper, (1977), “A Monetary Model of Exchange Market  
Pressure Applied to the post-war Canadian experience”, The American Economic 
Review, 67, 4, 537-547. 
 
Goldie, C. M. and R. C. Smith (1987). "Slow Variation with reminder: theory and  
Applications," Quarterly Journal of Mathematics, 38: 45-71. 
 
Goldstein, M., G. Kaminsky, et al. (2000), Assessing Financial Vulnerability,  
Washington D C, Institute for International Economics. 
 
Hill, B.M., 1975, “A simple general approach to inference about the tail of a  
Distribution”, Annals of Statistics, 3, 1163-1174. 
 
Kaminsky, G., S. Lizondo., and C. Reinhart, C., (1998), “Leading Indicators of 
Currency Crises”, IMF Staff Paper, 45, 1 (March), pp. 1-48. 
 
Kaminsky, G. and C. Reinhart., 1999, “The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking  
and Balance-of-Payments Problems”, American Economic Review, 89, 3, pp.473-500. 
 
   24
Koedijk, K. G. and C. J. M. Kool (1992). "Tail Estimates of East European  
Exchange Rates," Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 10(1): 83-96. 
 
Koedijk, K. G., P. Stork, and de Vries, C.G. (1992), "Differences between foreign  
exchange rate regimes: the view from the tails," Journal of International Money and  
Finance, 11: 462-73. 
 
  Krugman, P. (1979), “A Model of Balance of Payment Crises”, Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking, vol.11, pp. 311-325. 
 
Mason, D. M. (1982). "Laws of Large Numbers for Sums of Extreme Values," 
Annals of Probability ,10: 754-64. 
 
  Obstfeld, M. (1996), “Models of Currency with Self-Fulfilling Features”, European 
Economic Review, vol. 40, pp.1037-1047. 
 
  Pontines and Siregar (2005),“Evaluating Exchange Rate Regimes of a Selected 
East Asian Economies During the Post-1997 Financial Crisis”, mimeo, School of 
Economics, University of Adelaide. 
 
Pozo, S. and Dorantes, C.A., 2003, “Statistical Distributions and the Identification 
of Currency Crises”, Journal of International Money and Finance, 22, 591-609. 
 
  Sachs, J., A. Tornell, and A. Velasco (1996), “Financial Crises in Emerging 
Markets: The Lessons from 1995”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol.1, 
pp.147-215. 
 
  Siregar, R. (1999), “Real Exchange Rate Targeting and Inflation in Indonesia: 
Theory and Empirical Evidence”, Applied Financial Economics, Vol. 9, No. 4, August 
1999, pp.329-336. 
 
Siregar, R., and Rajan, R. (2004), “Impacts of Exchange Rate Volatility on 
Indonesia’s Trade Performance in the 1990s”, Journal of the Japanese and International 
Economies, Vol. 18, pp. 218-240. 
 
Williamson, J. (2004), “The Years of Emerging Market Crises: A Review of  
Feldstein”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLII (September), pp. 822-837.   25
Appendix:  Extreme Value Theory
13 
 
  Consider a stationary sequence X1, X2,…., Xn of iid random variables with a 
common distribution function F (d.f.F). Suppose one is interested in the probability that 
the maximum 
Mn = max(X1,X2,…..,Xn)    (A.1)  
of the first n random variables is below a certain level x. As is well known, this probability 
is given by  
P(Mn ) x ≤ = F
n(x)       (A.2) 
Extreme value theory studies the limiting distribution of the order statistic Mn 
appropriately scaled. That is, one is interested under which conditions there exist 
suitable two normalising constants an > 0 and bn, such that: 
) ( ) ( x G x a b M P
d
n n n →  ≤ −                         (A.3) 
where G(x) is a so-called a extreme value distribution and the superscript d indicates 
convergence in distribution. If 1 – F(x) is regularly varying at infinity, choosing bn = 0 and 
an = F
-1(1 – 1/n) we have 
) exp( ) (
α − − = x x G          α  > 0                         (A.4) 
where α  is the tail index. The tail index is a good indicator of the tail fatness as it is 
related to the number of moments that exist.  
  The advantage of the extreme value approach is that all fat-tailed models are 
nested with respect to their tail index into one model. The tail index, given a number of 
observations Xi can be estimated by parametric and nonparametric methods. The latter 
method is presented. Assume that X1,…..,Xn is a sample of independent realisations 
from a distribution F(x) with a regularly varying tail. Thus,   
                                                 
13 This section draws heavily from de Vries (1994), Koedijk and Kool (1992), Koedijk, Stork, and 










α − x          α  > 0         (A.5) 
Suppose the density f(x) exists. Through integration by parts we have the following 
equivalence: 
∫
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−
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∞
 dx                              (A.6) 
Combining equation (5) and (6) and applying the Lebesque convergence theorem 


























dx x f t x
t           (A.7) 
Let X(n)≥  X(n-1)≥ …  ≥ X(1) denote the ascending order statistics from the sample X1,…., 
Xn. Replace the left-hand side expression of equation (7) by its simple analog in order to 
estimate the inverse tail index γ  = 1/α . Let Fn(.) denote the empirical distribution function. 
Thus, for some k, which is the number of tail observations used to estimate α  and n 
represents the total number of return observations, take t = X(n-k) and hence: 













γ                                     (A.8) 
is the estimator first proposed by Hill (1975). Mason (1982) proved that under some 
regularity conditions γ ˆ is a consistent estimator for γ . Goldie and Smith (1987) showed 
that 
2 / 1 ) ˆ ( k γ γ − is asymptotically normal with mean 0 and variance γ
2. Consequently, α ˆ is 
also asymptotically normal with mean α  and variance α
2/k.  
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Percent After   
(Rupiah) 
Percent 
16 Sep 1992  6  0.25  10  0.50 
3 Jan 1994  10  0.5  20  1.00 
5 Sep 1994  20  1.00  30  1.50 
30 June 1995  30  1.50  44  2.00 
29 Dec 1995  44  2.00  66  3.00 
13 June 1996  66  3.00  118  5.00 
11  Sep  1996  118 5.00 192 8.00 
11 July 1997  192  8.00  304  12.00 
Source: Djiwandono (2000) 
 
Table 2: The Conventional Method 
 
() σ µ 5 . 1 + , where:µ  is the mean and σ  is the standard deviation 
 
  3-month exclusion window  6-month exclusion window 
 
 
n = # of 
Samples 
 




















Table 3: Basic Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
















Note: *The null hypothesis of a normally distributed EMP measure is rejected. 
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Table 4: Unit Root Tests 
 

















































* indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
a The ADF/DF-GLS procedure test the null that H0:  yt ~ I(1) against the alternative Ha: yt 
~ I(0).  
b The KPSS procedure test null that H0:  yt ~ I(0) against the alternative Ha: yt ~ I(1).  
   
 
 








Notes: the Ljung-Box Q-statistic tests the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation at the 







Table 6: HKKP-Extreme Value Theory 
 
   3-Month Window  6-Month Window 
















   29
Table 7: Crisis Episodes Using Conventional and EVT Methods with 
Corresponding Chronologies of Political and Economic Events/Factors 
 
Extreme Value Theory 
(EVT) 
Chronology of economic and political events 
  
Feb., Sept. 1985  Accelerated slump in world oil prices 
  
Nov. 1986  Worsening trade balance and increase in external debt due to 
drastic drop in world oil prices 
  
June 1987  Capital flight precipitates monetary crisis, and first Gebrakan 
Sumarlin results in interbank rates of up to 45 per cent; foreign 
investment regulations liberalised 
  
July 1988  Major financial sector reforms enacted entry provisions 
liberalised, reserve requirements reduced, and a withholding tax 
on bank deposits imposed 
  
June 1989  Rumours that government would let the rupiah to float; limit set 
on the rupiah’s depreciation 
  
April 1990  A further trade reform package; Bank Duta, one of the largest 
private banks, announces foreign exchange losses of $420 
million 
  
April 1994  Another scandal rocks the financial system, the Bapindo scandal; 
slowdown in the growth of non-oil/gas exports; eruption of labour 
unrest 
  
Sept. 1995  Fallout from the Mexican peso crisis 
  
Aug. 1997  Contagion effect from the depreciation of the Thai baht hits 
  
April 1998  Signs new IMF letter of intent; President Suharto steps down and 
Vice President Habibie takes over, amidst violent protests; plans 
to implement currency board system; IMF threatens to cut 
funding if currency board system implemented 
  
Feb., Nov. 2001  Dismissal of Abdurrahman Wahid and sworning in of Megawati 
Sukarnoputri as President; continuing political uncertainty and 
serious security concerns 
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Table 8: 
Crisis Episodes Ranked According to Size/Severity 










August 1997  37.81
a August  1997  37.81
a 
December 1986  20.98  November 1986  13.08
b 
February 2001  14.59  February 2001  14.59 
   April  1998  12.82
c 
   April  1994  11.71 
   June  1987  10.64 
July 1988  8.09  July 1988  8.09 
   April  1990  7.81 
   June  1989  7.34 
   September  1985  5.79 
   February  1985  5.62 
   September  1995  5.21 
   November  2001  5.01 
 
Notes:  
The crisis dates were based on a 6-month exclusion window and using 1.5 standard 
deviations above the mean for the conventional method.   
a, c Computed as the six-month average of the estimated EMPs beginning with the 
indicated crisis date.    
b average of November and December 1986. 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
 Figure 1: Ratio of Indonesian CPI over US CPI 
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Figure 2: Nominal and Real Rupiah Exchange Rate (Rp = 1US$) 
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Source: IFS-CD ROM and Authors’ own calculation.   2
Figure 3: GARCH (1,1) of Rupiah 
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Source: Authors’ own calculation.   3
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Figure 5: 
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Source: Author’s own calculation. 